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Abstract. We undertake a study where we examine changes in the profitability, productivity and 
price recovery of firms in the U.S. telecommunications industry over a sixteen-year period. We assess 
the performance of thirty-three major companies in the local-exchange sector over six time periods 
1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987 and 1990, using a performance analysis model which disaggregates 
the profitability measure into two components: productivity and price recovery. We demonstrate the 
computation of performance using this technique. Our study indicates that the opening up of mar- 
kets has had a significant impact on different dimensions of performance in the telecommunications 
industry, also validating a number of theoretical assumptions about the impact that industry changes 
are expected to have on firms. 
Key words: Productivity, performance analysis, telecommunications. 
JEL Classification: L96 (Telecommunications), M4O (Accounting: General) 
I. Introduction 
The liberalization of markets, leading to changes in the performance of partici- 
pant firms, is a major item on the institutional agenda of nations, with lessons to 
be gleaned from the U.S. telecommunications industry, where the world’s biggest 
regulated industry has gradually opened to competition. In this empirical note we 
evaluate if different performance parameters of firms providing telecommunica- 
tions services in the U.S. have changed significantly as a result of the institutional 
changes that have taken place. In carrying out the empirical component of the study 
we use a model of disaggregated performance measurement which allows for the 
decomposition of firms’ profitability into their productivity and price recovery 
components. A variant of the technique has been used to assess the performance of 
individual firms (Banker, Chang and Majumdar, 1993, 1995). However, its use in 
evaluating assumptions from economic theory, which may help explain firm-level 
responses to changes in market conditions, has been limited and the present paper 
is an extension of the earlier work. The paper is structured as follows. In Section II 
we describe the telecommunications industry, and the events that have taken place. 
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In Section III we have a discussion of the general implications of market liberaliza- 
tion on firm-level behavior. In Section IV we describe the research method used. 
Results and discussion follow in Section V, and Section VI sums up the paper. 
II. The Context 
The U.S. telecom,munications services industry has historically been comprised of 
two major segments, the local exchange sector and the long-distance sector. Local 
exchange companies account for the bulk of the telephone revenues in the country, 
and comprise the sector we study. They control the “last mile” of the network, 
which has given them their local monopoly status, and are responsible for services 
to both business and residential customers. They have also been responsible for 
providing in-state long-distance services. Long-distance companies, the primary 
company being AT&T Long Lines (now AT&T Communications), have been 
historically responsible for inter-state (and since 1984 inter-LATA) long-distance 
services. There are over fourteen hundred local-exchange companies; however, of 
these about fifty account for about ninety-five percent of local company revenues 
and have included Fortune 100 giants such as Pacific Bell, Southern Bell and 
Southwestern Bell Telephone, each with billions of dollars of annual revenues 
and many thousands of employees. The local companies have historically used 
their business and long-distance subscribers to cross-subsidize local residential 
customers. The bulk of the costs of telephone operations, on the other hand, are 
spent on non-traffic sensitive plant to interconnect local households; however, the 
primary sources of revenues have been the business and long-distance customers 
(Victor, 1989), and in the decade of the eighties this sector has become prospectively 
competitive (Wenders, 1989). 
The principal liberalization event in the U.S. telecommunications industry took 
place in 1984, with the divestiture by AT&T of its local operating companies. 
However, since 1956 a series of events has gradually changed the competitive 
fabric of the industry. These events attempted to convert monopoly markets into 
arenas where monopolistic competition could be sustainable in different segments. 
The primary motive was to challenge the AT&T dominance of the industry, on 
the grounds that the industry was lagging behind in efficiency and innovation as 
a result. The key events, all of which affected the local operating companies as 
well as the long-distance carriers, have been as follows, and their implications for 
making the market structure in the industry more competitive is also discussed. In 
1959 the “Above 890” decision opened the way for private networks to bypass the 
switched networks. Thus, key business customers, if they were able to afford it, 
could construct their own private telephone facilities, either locally or over long- 
distance. In 1968 the “Carterfone” decision allowed customers to connect their own 
equipment to the network. Thus, the network’s monopoly over equipment rental was 
ended. If necessary, customers could replicate their entire internal phone systems 
with their own equipment. The 1969 “MCI” decision allowed new networks to be 
U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 3 
built for the first time to be competitive with the existing networks, though initially 
the competitive impact was felt in the long-distance services area, both intra-state 
and inter-state. 
The above measures made the industry structure more competitive, akin to 
monopolistic competition, by allowing alternative suppliers entry into certain 
key segments. These segments were the highly profitable business sector which 
had cross-subsidized local residential services. The market liberalization process 
allowed facilities-based entry. Prices were still subject to local regulatory over- 
sight, and pricing flexibility or price-based competition did not occur till the 1977 
“Execunet” decision, which allowed price competition in the long-distance sector. 
The impact of these decisions has been to make certain key, high cash-flow yielding 
markets open to competition, in many cases challenging the monopoly positions of 
either AT&T owned (now Regional Holding Company [RHC]) operating compa- 
nies, other companies or the long-distance carriers. In 1984, the divestiture decree, 
implemented as a result of the implementation of the 1983 Modified Final Judg- 
ment given with respect to the revived 1981 anti-trust suit against AT&T, had the 
impact of breaking up the AT&T monopoly and distributing the assets among sev- 
eral players. It also made the long-distance sector fully open to competition, and 
made the local operating companies not only responsible for the local monopoly 
business, but also for a host of other businesses where competitive entry, based on 
facilities and price competition, was feasible (Bolter, McConnaughey and Kelsey, 
1990). 
III. Theory 
Because liberalization makes market entry easier, at a macro level of analysis the 
key effect is to increase the number of suppliers, with no change, however, in 
the number of buyers. This causes a drop in the overall price-cost margins, since 
entrants come in with a lower price to capture market share, forcing existing firms 
to drop their prices (Spence, 1977). Since high price-cost (profitability) margins are 
correlated with monopoly power (Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Shepherd, 1990), 
when monopoly power is reduced the primary impact is on firms’ profitability 
margins. Existing firms may then try to compensate for falling prices by being 
more efficient, exploiting initial opportunities before other entrants come in, and 
earning the same or higher margins in the short run; however, long run margins 
are likely to stabilize at some prior level because of the reduction of incentives for 
efforts to attaining efficiency. 
Spence (1986, p. 477) makes the following comment in the context of a market 
becoming competitive and where firms undertake measures to improve their effi- 
ciency: “Competition has two conflicting effects on process R&D and technical 
efficiency. It creates downward price pressures for individual firms: that has the 
effect of increasing incentives to carry out R&D and hence of improving technical 
efficiency. But as the number of firms increases market shares fall. Reduced sales 
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dilute the incentives to reduce costs because the cost-reduction expenditures are 
fixed given the rate of cost decline, while the benefits decline as market shares 
fall.” 
The impact of increasing competition then can be ambiguous. In some cases 
dynamic profitability can rise as existing firms take advantage of the liberalized 
environment to make higher sales through new product introductions, and as con- 
centration declines are also spurred towards better internal performance. However, 
with increasing entry margins are likely to fall as market shares decline, and this 
will be regardless of the ability of firms to maximize revenues or minimize costs. 
Hence, margins will fall because benefits from costs savings are eventually going 
to be less than the revenue losses from the decline in prices. Nevertheless, there 
may be an early period following deregulation in which margins do rise because 
newer entrants have not yet made their mark in the market. 
For the local operating companies, bypass, which means the use of facilities oth- 
er than that of the local operating companies, has been prevalent since the “Above 
890” decision of 1959, but has exacerbated since the 1970s. This has been driv- 
en by developments in alternative technologies such as radio-based, cable-based, 
and switching-based communication systems (Gill, McFarlan and O’Neill, 1989). 
Larger business customers, thus, have had the ability to not use local operating 
companies’ facilities except for very marginal needs. The situation has substan- 
tially altered in the 1980s with the introduction of the cellular phone, which serves 
to take away from the local operating companies a major chunk of their higher 
revenue generating customers. Though customers who use bypass services may 
have to pay access charges to the local companies, such charges do not nearly 
match the revenue losses suffered by these companies, particularly in high-density 
metropolitan areas which contain the most profitable customers (Meyer, Wilson, 
Baughcum, Burton and Caouette, 1980; Mitchell and Vogelsang, 1991). 
A second type of competitive pressure on local operating companies is intra- 
LATA competition. Long-distance carriers have exclusive privileges for inter-state, 
or since 1984 inter-LATA long-distance services provision. In many states the local 
operating companies have had monopoly rights over long-distance service provi- 
sions within LATA’s falling in their jurisdiction. However, many states, particularly 
populous ones such as Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania, 
allow intra-LATA long-distance competition (Bolter, McConnaughey and Kelsey, 
1990; Huber, 1987). Local operating companies have to provide these competitors 
equal access to their networks for call delivery, though the access revenues earned 
are often less than the long-distance revenues lost. Also, if some local operat- 
ing companies do not provide equal access to their intra-LATA competitors, the 
installed base of long-distance lines maintained by other long-distance companies 
are available to these intra-LATA service providers for a fee. For example, many 
long-distance companies lease lines in wholesale from AT&T, MCI and Sprint and 
are able to offer services at lower prices than those charged by the local operating 
companies or the main long-distance companies. Notwithstanding pressures on 
U.S. ELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 5 
revenues, the local network and plant owned by the operating companies have to 
be kept in place as they are. They account for most of the costs of a local operating 
company, cannot be dismantled, and have to stay in place for access to be avail- 
able for all. Even if efficiencies in operations are attained, there are finite limits to 
these, and the steady erosion of revenues means declining profitability over time 
as competitive forces exacerbate. 
Next, a more competitive environment becomes the biggest spur to attain effi- 
ciency in operations analysis, since costs cannot be passed on to consumers any 
longer. Wastages, slack in input utilization, and inflated wage costs are no longer 
tolerated (Kahn, 1988). Without increasing productivity, in increasingly competi- 
tive environments the long-run survival of the firm can be in doubt (Crew, Jones- 
Lee and Rowley, 1971) and liberalization induces pressures on firms to increase 
productivity (Leibenstein, 1976; Selten, 1986). In this aspect, several studies of 
the telecommunications industry (Bailey, 1986; Crandall, 1991; Majumdar, 1995) 
show rising productivity following liberalization, thus empirically supporting con- 
jectures positing significant scope for productivity improvements among local 
operating companies. Within the context of the U.S. telecommunications industry 
the issue of whether the productivity of firms is likely to arise from technological 
reasons or better utilization of human resources is relevant, given the changes in 
technological regimes. However, unlike the trucking industry where deregulation 
has led to the decline of rents of labor (Rose, 1987), Crandall (1991) notes that 
in the telecommunications industry relative wage rates have not fallen; instead, 
his empirical tests find better usage of human capital, in combination with faster 
adoption of digital switching, leading to substantial improvements in technical 
efficiency. 
Finally, in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, demand for a firm’s products 
may be inelastic and the producer can equate marginal revenue with marginal 
costs to maximize profits. Also, in a relatively non-monopolistic market, where 
search is costly for new firms and the possibility of entry is non-instantaneous, a 
dominant firm can collude to not allow new entrants entry, and enjoy prices near the 
monopoly level (Gaskins, 1971; Kamien and Schwartz, 1971). However, changing 
technology in telecommunications has permitted the minimum efficient scale size 
to become small enough to permit several viable competitors to enter, and enable 
new product offerings to take place and alternate sources of supply to be made 
available in many once-lucrative market segments (Shepherd, 1983). Coupled with 
the progressive introduction of competition, in such scenarios the demand curve 
faced by an erstwhile monopoly supplier becomes flatter and more elastic, and 
new competitors can charge lower prices to attract customers. Institutional changes 
imply that customers who have not had choices of changing their suppliers earlier 
now do have such choices. This means that existing suppliers have to drop their 
prices towards the marginal costs of supply, and such measures lead to drops in the 
price-recovery ability of firms. 
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For example, Bailey (1986) finds lowered prices as a result of market liberaliza- 
tion in the airlines, telecommunications, financial services and trucking industries; 
this trend is also borne out by Per1 (1988) in a study of prices in the post-divestiture 
telecommunications industry. Similarly, Crandall (1991) has noted that over the 
period 1977 to 1983 real telephone services prices dropped 3.7%, and the biggest 
drops were in interstate and intrastate toll services of 5% and 5.6% respectively 
though local prices also dropped 2.5%. In the period 1983 to 1988 services prices 
decreased .3% but there was an increase of 3.9% in local prices while interstate and 
intrastate toll prices dropped 10.2% and 3.2% respectively. Given that toll prices 
on a per-minute basis are the profit sanctuaries of telephone firms, such overall 
price declines prognosticate an overall trend of firms in the industry to not recover 
premium prices. 
The above consequences of competition can be illustrated analytically. On the 
supply side, the production function is typically given by y = ~J(K, L), where r~ 
is the physical quantity of output, K the quantity of capital employed, and L the 
quantity of labor input. We may include the effect of competition by specifying a 
parameter 0 to capture (exogenously) the degree of competition in the market (e.g., 
the number of firms in the market), and restate the production function as 
y = y(K, L$), ay/B > 0, 
since competition is likely to have the effect of reducing organizational slack. In 
consequence, the marginal cost curve shifts downwards as 0 increases (see Figure 
1). If there were no demand-side effects (i.e., the average revenue and marginal 
revenue curves were not affected by the degree of competition), the effect of greater 
competition would be to lower output prices and increuse the output quantity. 
There will, of course, be a demand-side effect of competition. In particular, we 
should expect the firm-level (selective) demand to exhibit the following character- 
istics relative to monopolistic demand: 
(a) At any given price, the firm-level demand in a competitive (multifirm) market 
will be lower than the corresponding monopolistic demand; and 
(b) At any given price, the price elasticity of the firm-level (selective) demand 
will be greater than that of monopolistic demand. 
The demand function at the firm level may be stated as 
y = y(p, O), 8y/6’0 < 0, and &j/ad > 0, G9 
where p is the price level and 7 is the absolute value of the price elasticity of 
demand, 7 = - + !?Y . 2. Under these conditions, the demand-side effect of com- 
petition is to decreasi the profit-maximizing output price and also to decreuse 
the output quantity. With both supply and demand side effects operating simulta- 
neously, increased competition has an unambiguous downward impact on price. 
For example, compare p* (131) with ~*(13c) in Figure 1. The impact on quantity 
is ambiguous, in that it is conceivable that the firm-level output could actually 
increase with greater competition. This is unlikely, for example, with the shift in 
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(a) Production Function 
L 
YW Y’W Y 
(b) Profit Maximizing Price and Output Levels 
Fig. 1. Supply- and demand-side effects of competition. 
the MC curve as shown in Figure 1, TJ*(&) is less than y*(,&), but possible in 
a situation where the increase in efficiency on account of competition leads to a 
dramatic shift downward in the marginal cost curve (the curve AfC’( 01) instead of 
A4C( 191) in Figure 1). 
Thus, the effect of competition is expected to exert a downward pressure on 
output prices. The demand-side effect alone on profits is clearly negative (since 
both prices and quantity are adversely affected), although this adverse impact is at 
least partially mitigated by the supply side effect of greater operating efficiency. 
To the extent that firms become more efficient in unticipation of competition, 
the supply-side benefits may be felt first, resulting in higher productivity and 
profitability for some period of time, until competitors actually establish themselves 
and profitability declines probably to below monopoly levels. 
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IV. Research Setting and Method 
A.CHOICE OF SEC'TDRFORSTUDYANDHOWPEWORMANCE IS COMP~D 
We have already described that though local operating companies are still subject 
to major regulation, in their key profit sanctuaries the winds of competition have 
blown since the late 1960s and early 1970s. We test our expectations from theory 
and evaluate the performance of these companies for 1975,1978,1981,1984,1987 
and 1990. 1975 is an ideal period to initially anchor the study since prior to that 
year not many measures to liberalize the industry had taken place. By 1978 some 
market-opening measures were being implemented and price-competition was first 
allowed into the industry. In 1981 political moves to liberalize began after the 
Reagan administration took office, culminating in the 1984 divestiture. Thus, we 
have an overall span of sixteen years, critical in the history of the industry, wherein 
we can evaluate the impact of market liberalization of firms. The three-year gap 
between each time period also enables dynamic lags to be factored through. Since 
there was a recessionary period from 1979 to 1982, data points before and after 
this period also enable us to judge the effects of liberalization. 
B. PERFORMANCE RATIOS USEDTOANALYZEPERFORMANCE 
We use input, output and price data for each firm for each of t( t = 1, . . . Tj 
time-periods (where t = 1 . . .6). In period t, the firm utilizes X; units of each 
n = 1,. . . N inputs to produce yk units of each m = 1,. . . A4 outputs. The price 
of input n in period t is wi, and the price of output m is &. Thus, total revenues add 
up to EE=, &?J& > 0, and the total costs amount to X:=1 wkxk > 0, yielding 
a profit of E$Lt &y& - X:=1 wt xt . The profitability ratio for period t is X’ = 
EiL PLYZJ EL, W~CE~ and thei&tability change ratio PFTBLT = 7rt/ro. 
Thus, 
M M 
lx PLY; x PFnYil 
PFTBLT = m;’ lm;’ . (31 
lx w;x; Ix PFLYi 
7Z=l ?I=’ 
Depending on the purpose of the analysis, the base level 0 can be defined as 
a firm’s own performance during some period in the past, as some technically 
determined standard, as another firm’s performance, or as the performance of the 
industry as a whole. In this study our interest is in comparing the performance of 
the firms that make up the local operating sector; thus, we use average prices and 
quantities for the sector as a whole, pooled for the six periods, to compute the base 
level ratio. 
The production technology relating the inputs and outputs is assumed to be a gen- 
eralized fixed- proportions technology. That is, the standard input requirement ( Zn) 
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for an input n, corresponding to the production of outputs y = ( yl , Kym, jYy~) 
is given by 
Zn = gn(y) fern = 1 . ..N (4) 
with Z~ > 0 for y > 0. In addition, the focus of this paper is long-term inter-period 
analysis, and we assume that costs are linear and variable in the long run. That 
is 
where $mn > 0 is the standard input requirement for a unit of output cm). We 
refer to this as the standard production technology assumption. 
For further analysis, an approach suggested by the American Productivity Center 
(APC) can be used to decompose the profitability change ratio in (3) into its 
productivity and price recovery parts. The productivity change ratio is defined as 
the ratio of the value of current level output to base level output, divided by the 
ratio of the value of current-period inputs to base level inputs. The productivity 
change ratio measures the technical efficiency of firms. The price recovery ratio 
is defined as the ratio of the value of outputs at current period prices to the value 
at base level prices, divided by the value of inputs at current period prices to the 
value at base level prices. The price recovery ratio helps measure the abilities of 
firms to be price or allocatively efficient. 
The APC method has only been described briefly before via numerical examples 
(Banker, Datar and Kaplan, 1989; Kendrick, 1986), and its use is particularly 
apposite when a composite measure of performance such as profitability requires 
decomposition, so as to capture different elements, such as the impact of efficient 
resource utilization or allocative efficiency, that are subsumed within it (Shepherd, 
1986). It is a particularly useful technique to test the assumptions underlying the 
theory of industrial organization. We outline the APC method, representing it 
algebraically, via seven steps. STEP 1: Compute an output value change ratio 
STEP 2: Compute a weighted average of the output quantity changes 
(7) 
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where the weights are the revenue shares, j, of the different outputs in period 0. 
STEP 3: Compute an output price change index 
OPC = OVC/OQC = 5 pky;/ 5 p;y$ (8) 
m=l m=l 
STEP 4 Compute a partial input productivity change measure 
IP& = OQC/(x-~[x~), n.. . N PI 
as the ratio of the output quantity change index to the quantity change for each input. 
STEP 5: Compute the aggregate productivity change ratio, APRDT, as the weight- 
ed average of the partial input productivity scores, 
APRDT = 2 &;(IPC,J/ 5 u&x; 
n=l k=l 
where the weights are the cost shares, k, of the inputs = wt zt n n 
period t. 
STEP 6: Compute the profitability change ratio as in (1) and express it as the 
weighted sum of partial profitability change measures 
PRFn = OVC[(w;x;/w;x;). 
The weights are again the input cost shares, so that 
PFTBLT = 5 w;x;(PRFn) 15 w;x; 
k=l n=l 
rM 
STFLP 7: Compute the price recovery change ratio APRCR = PFTBLT/ 
APRDT 
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C. DATA SOURCES USED -to CALCULATE THE RATIOS 
There are about fifty major local telephone operating companies in the U.S., with 
annual revenues of $100 million or more. They include all erstwhile Bell operating 
companies, independent companies such as Rochester Telephone, and compa- 
nies belonging to GTE, United Telecommunications, Central and the Continental 
groups. We calculate performance measures for thirty-three of these for six time 
periods: 1975,1978,1981,1984,1987 and 1990. The other companies are not used 
because of missing data problems. 
For the thirty-three companies whose performance we analyze, data is obtained 
from the annual Federal Communications Commission publication titled “Statis- 
tics of Communications Common Carriers”. All telephone companies subject to 
reporting requirements, and even those not so subject, file financial and operat- 
ing data with the Federal Communications Commission. These include detailed 
breakdown of revenues, costs, assets, physical outputs and physical assets. 
To calculate the performance ratios certain basic data about a firm’s operation 
are required. These include details of its outputs, the composition of its revenue 
streams, how the total operating expenses are composed, and details about the 
physical assets or resources that enable it to provide the products or services that it 
does. The following measures are used to compute the performance ratios. 
D. MEASLJRES OFOUTPUTS ANDINPUTS 
We choose two physical output measures. These are the annual total number of 
local and toll calls respectively. Financial output measures are local and toll call 
revenues. Toll revenues also include access revenues earned by the companies 
because they permit their networks to be used by other long-distance companies, 
and miscellaneous revenues are split between local and toll revenues in the propor- 
tion that each bears to total operating revenues. Allied to the measures of output are 
inputs which are the operating costs incurred, which are maintenance and deprecia- 
tion costs, while traffic, commercial, general office and other expenses are variable 
costs, which vary with the volume of activity. 
V. Analysis and Discussion of Results 
A. GENERAL ANALYSIS 
Table I gives the descriptive statistics which show how the average performance 
ratios for all the firms in the industry have behaved from 1975 to 1990. 
We find that profitability falls from 1975 to 1978 and from 1978 to 198 1. This is 
consistent with expectations. However, it rises in 1984 relative to 1981 following 
divestiture and the accompanying strategic changes, but then falls in 1987 relative 
to 1984 and in 1990 relative to 1987. It is, of course, feasible that the recovery in 
1984 may be a reaction of firms to improved opportunities following the recession 
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TABLE I. Descriptive statistics 
R. D. BANKER ET AL. 
Panel (a): Profitability change ratio 
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 
Mean 1.091 1.083 1.031 I .044 1.013 0.929 
Standard 0.088 0.070 0.057 0.044 0.038 0.035 
Deviation 
Minimum 0.950 0.959 0.916 0.961 0.928 0.865 
Maximum 1.289 1.227 1.151 1.125 1.113 1.009 
Panel (b): Productivity change ratio 
Mean 0.642 0.726 0.790 1.096 1.273 1.523 
Standard 0.171 0.186 0.209 0.313 0.332 0.466 
Deviation 
Minimum 0.302 0.399 0.421 0.656 0.742 0.794 
Maximum 1.345 1.497 1.696 2.376 2.396 2.344 
Panel (c): Price recovery change ratio 
Mean 1.800 1.576 1.379 1.014 0.841 0.673 
Standard 0.451 0.376 0.327 0.256 0.194 0.225 
Deviation 
Minimum 0.804 0.720 0.603 0.441 0.425 0.398 
Maximum 3.186 2.478 2.257 1.663 1.364 1.147 
of the early 1980s. The productivity change ratio rises monotonically from 1975 
to 1990, and the price recovery change ratio falls consistently, from 1975 to 1990. 
From Table I it seems that the fall in profitability that takes place between 1975 
and 1990 has been counter-balanced mainly by increasing productivity. While 
the price recovery ratio has dropped dramatically, the negative impact of such a 
drop has been somewhat mitigated by the concerted positive impact of the rise 
in productivity. Detailed results of the statistical tests carried out on the ratios are 
given in Table II. We evaluate if each ratio for a following is greater than that of the 
previous year. In Table II, the test carried out is to evaluate if the ratio for the row 
year is less than that of the column year. We use the Wilcoxon (1945) procedure 
and the cell numbers are the z-score, followed in parentheses by the probability 
value that the score is significantly different from zero. 
Initially we posit that as markets became more competitive due to deregulation 
profitability over the long-run will decrease, but may rise in the immediate short 
run because of greater opportunities for incumbents to maximize revenues, while 
incentives to reduce costs will also increase. However, relative to such increases in 
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TABLE II. Statistical test results 
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Panel (a): Profitability 
1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 
1975 -0.116 -4.297 -3.064 
(0.91) (0.00) (0.00) 
























Panel (b): Productivity 
1975 4.637 4.833 5.011 5.04 5.011 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1978 4.547 5.011 5.011 4.994 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1981 4.994 5.04 4.940 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 




Panel (c): Price recovery 
1975 -I.672 -5,04 -5.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
























p value that the z statistic is different from zero in parenthe- 
ses. 
the profitability margin, there will be a compression in profitability in later periods 
as increasing competition brings severe pressures to bear on the revenue streams 
of extant firms. The test results are shown in Table II. 
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The test of a difference in the profitability change ratio between the years 
1975 and 1978 is not significant. However, between 1978, when price competition 
entered the industry, and 1984 profitability has fallen significantly. In 198 1 the 
institutional changes likely to take place were put in process. Incumbent firms may 
have exercised market power to gain an advantage in profits, as the increase in 
the ratio between 1981 and 1984 shows. However, when divestiture took place 
and key parts of the industry were deregulated in 1984, profits thereafter fell. The 
ratio drops further between 1984 and 1987, and between 1987 and 1990, with such 
drops being statistically significant. 
C. THE IMPACT OF F%ODUCTIVIT~ 
Since a firm can face pressures to be cost efficient, or focus on generating revenues 
to earn greater profits, attaining productivity in operations is one of the key means of 
contributing to a firm’s profitability. Reviewing Table II we see that the productivity 
ratio in the sample of firms increases consistently, from 1975 to 1978, 1978 to 
1981, 1981 to 1984, 1984 to 1987 and 1987 to 1990. Details of the statistical tests 
undertaken are presented in panel (b) of Table II. 
The increases in the ratio between each pair of years compared, 1975 to 1978, 
1978 to 1981, 1981 to 1984, 1984 to 1987 and 1987 to 1990 are statistically 
significant, and the fact that the productivity ratio has monotonically increased over 
the entire period 1973 to 1987 is also highlighted by a review of Table II across the 
diagonal. Increases in the ratio between the succeeding pairs of years are all positive 
and are statistically significant. That the most significant betterment in productivity 
takes place between 1981 and 1984, and the rises between 1984 and 1987 and 1987 
and 1990 are also very high, is shown in Table I. Following divestiture the firms 
have had to find other sources of improved performance, given that our results 
reveal a significant decline in profitability between 1984 and 1990. One key source 
has been significantly increased productivity. Our second expectation, that with 
increasing opening up of markets the productivity of telecommunications firms 
will increase, is also validated, and the evidence is consistent with that of other 
researchers. 
D. THE IMPACT ON PRICE RECOVERY 
Next, we have posited that the ability of a regulated firm to recover high prices for 
its products will decline as deregulation leads to the intensification of competition; 
and, we will expect such declines to continue if a deregulated environment becomes 
intrinsic in an industry. In Table I we have noted that the price recovery change 
sharply declines in every period from 1975 to 1990. This suggests that competition 
from new entrants brings extremely strong pressures on the erstwhile monopoly 
telecommunication firms to reduce their prices. Statistical tests results on this ratio 
are given in panel (c) of Table II. From Table II we also note that the decrease 
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in the price recovery ratio is monotonic throughout the period of our study. Each 
succeeding year ratio is very significantly less than that of the previous year, and a 
reading across the diagonal of the results indicates this to be the trend between all 
pairs of years. These results validate our expectations and our evidence is consistent 
not only with the assumptions of theory, but also with other extant studies. 
VI. Summary and Future I3irections 
Analyzing the impact changes such as market liberalization on various dimensions 
of firm performance is a major area for empirical researchers. We have carried out 
one such study in the context of the U.S. telecommunications industry. The results 
of our study help validate some assumptions as to how environmental changes 
such as market liberalization impact on firms. The implications of these assump- 
tions have import for our understanding of firm-level change. While pressures 
on margins and prices are likely to develop, firms face greater incentives to adopt 
efficiency-oriented behavior, leading to increases in operating efficiencies. All these 
expectations hold up in our study of the U.S. telecommunications industry over a 
period of major strategic change between 1975 and 1990. From the warm sun of a 
regulated industry in 1975, in transition to a scenario in 1990 where cold showers 
of competitive pressures run, firms have significantly changed their behavior. 
We demonstrate that while overall profitability margins may rise and then fall 
as a result of the macro-level market forces, separate micro-level components of 
firm performance that impact such profitability also change significantly. With 
increasing competition we expected the price recovery ability of firms to drop 
as more suppliers entered the markets of existing players, seeking customers. 
However, to counteract such trends firms increase their operational efficiencies 
through increasing productivity. As a result of such focusing and paying attention 
to operating efficiencies, firms are able to counteract and offset the drop in profits 
likely to be caused by a drop in the price recovery ratio. 
Though our study is anchored in one industry, the implications are generalizable 
elsewhere. Even if overall performance, as measured by the profitability margin, 
stays the same or may not vary much, the underlying factors that influence it can 
change dramatically. We thus use our results to demonstrate some temporal patterns 
about the impact of changes such as market liberalization, though information on 
future years’ performance of the firms concerned can add more meaning to the 
results. It is possible that over time pressures of competition may exacerbate, so 
as to have a U or an inverted U-shaped impact on all dimensions of performance. 
We can use future years’ time-series data then to evaluate whether the underlying 
patterns exhibited in the current study do remain stable over time, and draw general 
conclusions about the firm-level impact of market changes. 
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